The Internet has mutated from a government service to
a commercial system. Its evolution is driven by economic motivations more than
by social welfare considerations. At this stage, what is lacking is an
understanding of the economics of networks and the interplay between protocols,
the economic mechanisms they enable, and the economic incentives that result.
This proposal studies the games that network users and
providers face when making strategic choices. These games are dynamic and the
players have asymmetric information. A central issue concerns the incentives for
network evolution: Do providers have investment incentives to improve the
network or are they impeded by the limitations of other providers. The proposal
explores mechanisms that provide suitable incentives and examines their
scalability, security, potential for incremental deployment and extensibility.
The techniques combine game and optimization theory
with simulations of distributed algorithms. The protocols are implemented in
network simulations that reproduce the actions of the different network
providers and users. The proposal studies wireless and wired networks.
The research should lead to protocols for service differentiation and resource sharing among network and service providers with validation of their properties and potential for wide deployment.
Last Edited 09/25/2006