Wi-Fi (802.11) networks are proliferating rapidly and are a great technology to provide broadband access to the Internet. Wi-Fi access points are appearing in coffee-shops, airports, hotels, public spaces, and in private residences. We study mechanisms that would provide a suitable incentive for owners of a Wi-Fi access point to make it available to other users.
We envision a universal micro-payment scheme. The mobile user M detects an access point AP. AP proposes a price per unit time (say per minute) to M. M decides whether to accept the payment or to walk away. How should AP select the price and what should M do?
We model the problem as a game with asymmetric information. M knows more than AP about his intentions and his utility of the connection. One critical feature of the problem is the evolution over time of the game: AP learns from the past decisions of M.
This paper describes three models: web browsing, file transfer, and hybrid. The web browsing user has a utility that is proportional to the duration of the session. The file transfer user derives a utility only if he gets the complete file. The hybrid user has some probability of being a web browser and intends to transfer a file otherwise.